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Abstract
Assessing the risk of epidemic spread on networks and developing strategies for
its containment is of tremendous practical importance, both due to direct ef-
fects in public health and its impact on economies. In this work we present the
numerical results of a stochastic, event-driven, hierarchical agent-based model
designed to reproduce the infectious dynamics of the cattle disease called Bovine
Viral Diarrhea (BVD), for which the corresponding movements’ network is the
main route of spreading. For the farm-node dynamics, the model takes into ac-
count a vast number of breeding, infectious and animal movement mechanisms
via a susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR) type of dynamics with an additional
permanently infectious class. The interaction between the farms is described by
a supply and demand farm manager mechanism governing the network structure
and dynamics. We discuss the disease and breeding dynamics, study numerous
mitigation strategies of present and past government regulations taking Ger-
many as a case-study country and perform a sensitivity analysis on key param-
eters. We argue that the model, subject to calibration, has universal predictive
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potential, can be extended to diseases beyond BVD and demonstrate that ap-
propriate measures can indeed lead to eradication regarding BVD. We further
present the time-series’ results of the model and conduct a statistical analysis
of and among the different mitigation strategies.
1. Introduction
Disease containment in the form of some intervention strategy is the main
goal of any biosecurity program. In the last decades efforts on the behalf of
governments have been implemented at country levels for the purpose of disease
containment in livestock, especially for the European case, with the advent of
integrated union policies. A major such disease that has been afflicting the
livestock industry is Bovine Viral Diarrhea (BVD) [1, 2, 3, 4].
BVD is a disease caused by the virus of the pestivirus family. The main
symptom of an ailing animal is diarrhea but general fatigue, fever and mucosal
secretions are among the accompanying inflictions. Contagion can occur from all
sorts of bodily fluids (including sneezing droplets) as well as from contaminated
material or agricultural equipment. The symptoms persist for one to two weeks
before the animal is recovered, provided complications, leading to its death,
do not occur. The main peculiarity of BVD is its persistence when affecting
early-stage embryos of carrying cows. If the embryos in question have not yet
developed fully their immune system it is highly likely that they will carry the
virus for the rest of their lives and be thus an enormous source of infection,
provided they are born. Respectively, cows undergoing the disease are likely to
be led to abortions [5, 6].
The impact of BVD on the agricultural industry, both beef and dairy, is im-
mense due to losses in animals as well as due to the reduced milk yield. This has
led to numerous studies exploring the impact of BVD, its containment practices
and potential to the economy for different countries [1, 2, 7, 8]. Such studies
have been focused on the in-herd dynamics in an aggregated fashion regarding
the animal population [9], have explored the empirical network effect of cat-
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tle movements on BVD spread with simple dynamics [10], have combined the
two aforementioned elements in metapopulation models generically [11] and in
a multiscale, data-driven fashion (Italy) [12] for predicting the spatial spread of
BVD investigating several intervention strategies, and have formulated expert
systems to test present and potential policies based on data-driven simulations
(Ireland) [13]. Furthermore, there have been some instances of economic as-
sessment of policies against BVD based on data [14], one based on the model
presented in [15] and its results scrutinized in this paper [16].
Putting our model to the test on real data, we use the animal trade network
of Germany as a testbed. The current regulations on the containment of BVD
are based on the mandate issued over ten years ago and implemented in 2011.
It has focused on the detection and removal of persistently infected (PI) animals
by testing calves with an antigen (virus detection) test soon after their birth
[17]. An amendment was introduced in 2016 envisioning a quarantine of 40
days on farms suspected of PI animals through testing [18]. The results have
been impressive in comparison to historical data, although they did not lead to
eradication [19].
With the current work we aim to employ the refined approach of an agent-
based model for the combined dynamics of animal movements and in-herd infec-
tions as opposed to aggregate methods [20]. This sort of modeling allows for a
great level of detail to be included in the system. We additionally include a sim-
ulation plan of scenarios encompassing a wide range of intervention strategies
emulating common biosecurity policies such as testing and vaccination. From
that point we give an overview and interpretation of the resulting time-series for
the global population as well as histograms for the infected animal populations
at the farm level. Finally, we compare the statistical similarity of the time-series
of the system running under no containment strategy with all the rest of the
scenarios in pairs, utilizing the non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test.
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2. Materials and methods
The model. We start with a short overview of the model that we developed. All
the related details following the ODD (Overview, Design concepts and Details)
protocol [21] can be found in a technical work of ours on the subject [15].
For the simulation of BVD spread through the German cattle movement
network we formulated an agent-based, stochastic, event-driven and hierarchi-
cal code in C++. We decided for the model to be agent-based (the animals
being agents) with the aim to capture a great level of detail as reported in [20].
Furthermore, we introduced hierarchy in the sense that actions could correspond
to different aggregates of agents (animals), thus enabling actions for a group of
animals (herd), for a node in the network (the premises) and for the systems as
a whole (for introducing intervention strategies). Stochasticity was something
we also assumed necessary for both breeding and infectious features, so as to
adequately model their complex, real world fluctuations. Moreover, we built
the model in an event-driven fashion [22] in order to benefit from the trade-off
between following the trajectory of an agent in continuous time and observing
it only when a relevant, previously scheduled event is executed [23].
Regarding the dynamics of the model, those were designated in two separate
processes, namely to that of the in-farm (premise) dynamics and to that of the
animal flow (movement) between the farms. For the former we employed the in-
fectious SIR scheme with a permanently infectious class found in Viet et al. [24]
(see figure 1), while for the latter a rule that every premise should demand or
offer animals only when its population lacks or exceeds a certain quota respec-
tively. In the case of the infectious, in-farm dynamics we assumed well-mixed
conditions, i.e. no spatial structure and equal probabilities for all the suscep-
tible animals to be infected. Accordingly, following standard SIR dynamics we
defined a stochastic, instantaneous transmission rate for the infections in ques-
tion, that dictated the inflow of infections in the pool of susceptible animals for
each farm in a Markovian manner [15, 23]. For the latter dynamics, essentially
the network dynamics, we supplied the farms, assuming solely dairy farms due
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(a) Vertical states.
(b) Combined horizontal and vertical
states.
Figure 1: Schematics (state charts) of the vertical (through births) 1a and combined with
horizontal (through contact) 1b infectious states SIRP. The dashed lines denote vertical trans-
mission paths (i.e. from mother to calf), while the solid horizontal ones. Note that a path
to the demise of the animal is also taken into account with the letter “D”. Additionally, the
letters “V” and “M” take into account temporary immunization effects induced by vaccination
and protection through maternal antibodies respectively.
to their high significance in the disease spread in Germany [3, 12], with the
simplest supply and demand rule
surplus/deficit = |Nquota −Ninstant| (1)
i.e. the requirement that the number of animals offered or demanded (no special
criterion applied for their selection) should be determined by the difference of
an animal quota for each particular farm (specified upon initialization) Nquota
with the number of animals in the farm at the time of the movement Ninstant.
A surplus occurs when Nquota > Ninstant and a deficit in the opposite case. To
moreover ascertain that the system is not dissipative nor inflationary (i.e. that
relation (1) for each farm is satisfied by the rest of the farms of the system),
we include a source and a drain farm, which physically correspond to imports
from outside the system (country) and slaughterhouses respectively. The precise
details for both the infectious and the network dynamics can be found in our
technical, ODD report [15].
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In addition, the model includes system-level intervention strategies including
animal testing for their infectious status, non-targeted vaccination (immuniza-
tion) as well as individual farm isolation (quarantine) for explicitly specified
periods of time. Last but not least, we mention the sensitivity analysis on
control parameters such as infectious transmission rate, vaccine and infectious
identification (test) efficacy in [15]. The related code is publicly available on
GitHub at the URL https://github.com/Yperidis/bvd_agent_based_model
and follows the “Overview, Design and Details” protocol [21].
Simulation setup. For setting up and initializing the model’s simulations we
used expert opinion and the literature [3, 9, 10, 12, 25, 26, 27]. The exact
details for the selection of all the parameters and the distributions employed
can be found in the model’s technical description [15]. The same holds for
benchmarking with previous works of the literature.
Here we only mention the minimal relevant settings, which can also be ref-
erenced in the simulation scheduling as summarized in tables 1 and 2 [28].
• The simulation was set to run for 20,000 time steps (the choice of the
simulation parameters makes the time step a calendar day as explained in
[15]).
• The units used for all the simulation’s parameters mapped each time step
to a calendar day. Thus the entire runs accounted to approximately 55
years.
• The involved tests’ (antigen and antibody) sensitivity was set to 99.8%,
while their specificity was assumed to be 100%.
• The probability that a vaccination’s effect would successfully immunize
the animal in question was set to 99.85%.
• The infectious transmission coefficients, as defined in [24], were set to
βTI = 0.03 and βPI = 0.5.
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• Only farms with populations over 10 animals have been included in the
simulation. Smaller farms are deemed to have a negligent contribution to
the spread of BVD in the network.
• The periodicity with which all the farms were queried as to their popula-
tion status was set to 7 days.
For the terms old and new regulation as used in table 1, a detailed explana-
tion can be found in [28] and the original text of the regulations can be found
at [17] and [18].
For the initialization of the farms’ population we employed the farm size
distribution of all of Germany scaled down to the size of the federal state of
Thuringia. The scaling was performed due to computational resource limita-
tions and we comment on that in the “Discussion” section. Regarding the
initialization of the four different states of the population in each farm we first
divided the farms into two classes: those having PI animals and those devoid
of them. Then we set the first class to be a total of 2% of all the farms. Fur-
thermore, we set a 2% probability for the animals entering the system in every
instance of an import from the source farm to be PI, to account for a minimal
BVD spread breaching the biosurveillance border system (this feature can be
annulled and we make special reference to it in the supplementary material).
Finally, we set the states of the animals for the population of each farm to be
distributed according to the following probabilities for the two classes: (S, TI,
R, PI)PI=(0.46, 0.06, 0.46, 0.02) and (S, TI, R, PI)PI-free = (0.79, 0.005, 0.205, 0),
where S stands for “susceptible”, TI for “transiently infected” and R for “re-
covered” (lifelong immunity). According to expert opinion from Dr. Gethmann
of the Friedrich-Loeffler Institute, the aforementioned figures in a normalized
population of farms and corresponding animals depicted the status of BVD in
Germany upon the commencement of the nationwide biosecurity measures in
2011.
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Strategy Description
1 No control (baseline)
2 Old regulation
3 New regulation
4 New regulation and vaccination
5a New regulation and YCW with a semesterly frequency
5b New regulation and YCW with an annual frequency
6a New regulation, vaccination and YCW with a semesterly frequency
6b New regulation, vaccination and YCW with an annual frequency
7 YCW with a semesterly frequency
8 Vaccination
9 Vaccination and YCW with a semesterly frequency
Table 1: The different strategies comprising the scenarios presented in table 2. YCW stands
for the “young calf window” testing protocol.
Figure 2: The scenario scheduling plan. STR stands for “strategy” as outlined in table 1. A
color block denotes the effect of the same strategy throughout the different starting days.
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Data sets. As implied in the previous paragraph, the data-driven part of the
model appeared upon the initialization with the input of a farm size distribution
from a csv formatted file. This file consisted of two columns of integer numbers,
one standing for farm number and the other for animal count. Each row linked
the number of farms with the number of animals they corresponded to.
For the scaling of the German farm size distribution (≈ 126 animals in
≈ 157, 000 farms) to the size of the federal state of Thuringia (≈ 350, 000 animals
in ≈ 1, 600 farms) we simply multiplied all the entries of the farm column with
a fraction of the total farm count for which the total animal count would be
that of Thuringia (≈ 350, 000). This number turned out to be ≈ 0.0279.
Identification of infected animals. The objective of any biosurveillance policy
is to correctly detect infected animals. In the case of BVD the related policies
focus on the detection of the PI animals either through an antigen or an antibody
test [6]. Essentially the difference of the two consist of the direct detection of
the virus, which is permanent in the PI animals, and the appearance of BVD
virus antibodies in an animal indicating its infection (therefore transient) at
some past point respectively.
Within the code we set two different modes of testing, accounting for both
antigen and antibody tests.
• Antigen test – Regular blood test This is a test that identifies infected (both
transiently and persistently) animals. It is scheduled to be performed at
the birth of an animal and is not repeated throughout the animal’s life-
time. If an animal is identified as infected it is sent to the slaughterhouse
within half a day. We envision additionally a challenge to a positive test
outcome as a rare event, that leads to a second antigen test whose re-
sult determines irrevocable the fate of the animal in question. Due to the
transient nature of the infection in otherwise healthy animals, the removal
policy in question is targeted in its vast majority to the PI animals.
• Antibody test – Young calf window (YCW) policy This is a semesterly or
annual test that identifies recovered animals similar to policies in Ireland
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N ≤ 10 ≤ 20 ≤ 40 ≤ 80 ≤ 160 > 180
n 8 10 12 13 13 14
Table 2: Sample sizes given a farm population according to the young calf window method.
Population sizes (N) and the corresponding samples (n) needed to be tested negative so that
the prevalence of the infected animals in the population will not exceed 20% with a confidence
of 95%.
and Scotland [13, 29, 30]. It is performed at the specified times at the
farm level, for a random selection of animals as summarized in table 2
with a methodology based on a hypergeomteric distribution sampling as
outlined in [31]. In case of a positive result an antigen test (regular blood
test) is scheduled for every animal in the farm that has not been already
tested. Note that, as in the antigen test case, in this manner only the PI
animals are targeted.
Hypothesis testing – Mann-Whitney U test. Having any two sets of series of
data with no specified assumption as to the form of their distribution (e.g.
normal), one can use a non-parametric test to query about them following the
same distribution (null hypothesis or H0 valid) or not (alternative hypothesis or
H1 valid). Such a statistical test assuming independent samples is the Mann-
Whitney U test [32, 33].
The whole reasoning behind the Mann-Whitney U test lies in sorting the
parts of the two independent (unpaired) samples in question in ascending or-
der and measuring their absolute differences, i.e. the shift of their underlying
distributions. The details of the implementation can be found in the original
work [32] as well as in textbooks [33]. In our case any two time-series of the PI
fraction of animals are the pairs of independent samples (because each one is
initiated with a different seed in the stochastic simulation). Since our baseline
scenario is No 1 we compare it pairwise to all the rest of the scenarios, i.e. we
perform the test 12 times for the 13 scenarios. Finally, we set the significance
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level for the test to be 0.05 and run the wilcox.test function in the R language to
produce a p-value. A p-value less than 0.05 will mean that the null hypothesis
H0 should be rejected otherwise it should be accepted.
3. Results
Disease extinction. Having allowed the simulation to run as outlined in the
plan 2 we obtained 13 different time-series for the four states of the system
(susceptible, transiently infected, PI and recovered) as exhibited in figures 5
and 6. Two questions that immediately arise are firstly, whether the PI class
of animals is eradicated in any of the tested intervention strategies beyond a
certain point in time, and secondly how fast (i.e. at which time) this eradication
prevails.
A rather inconspicuous behavior that the system exhibited concerning the
spread of BVD through the PI animals was their introduction through the source
farm, taken that we had set a probability of 2% for the incoming animals to
be PI. All the animal introductions from the source farm for the given farm
distribution with which the simulation was initialized ended at the 1,884th time
step (10,159 introductions in total) and respectively the last PI animal entering
the system was observed at the 561st time step. The former numerical figure
demonstrates that for the given initialization the system quickly settles on a self-
sustained trade to satisfy relation (1) upon every management period (week),
while the latter signifies the end of the BVD spread amplification from exter-
nal triggering. To understand if the external PI amplification intensifies the
epidemics we also ran the simulation for a 0% probability of PI introductions
upon animals entering the system through the source farm. In that case the
introductions lasted until the 1,891st time step (10,369 of total introductions),
indicating again a state in time beyond which the system trade is self-sustained.
In this latter case of no PI introductions in the system, the epidemic peak was
slightly lowered compared to that of PI animals being introduced in the system
with a 2% probability (see the description of scenario 1 further on). Yet the PI
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prevalence remained the same in both cases by the 10,000th time step, rendering
the effect of the PI animals’ introduction negligible for the scenarios of table 2,
which will be the focus of any further analysis. For a minimal example of how
the PI prevalence is affected by PI introductions and their absence throughout
the simulation reference the supplementary material (“Effect of PIs from the
Source Farm”).
To address the question of PI eradication and its rate during the simulation,
we draw the histograms of the PI population fraction for all the farms in as-
cending order of attributed ID numbers and for all the scenarios of plan 2, as
seen in figure 3. Technically speaking, the ID attribution to the farms given
from the farm size distribution is performed in a way such that the ascension
of IDs corresponds to larger farms in terms of population. Thus, the aforemen-
tioned histogram also holds the answer to the farm size threshold above which
there is a non-zero PI prevalence in scenarios where eradication is not achieved
respectively.
The first direct result we notice by inspection of figure 3 is that PI eradica-
tion is achieved for scenarios 5, 8, 9 and 13 (see again tables 1 and 2). What all
these scenarios have in common throughout the duration of their intervention
strategies (i.e. beyond the 10,000th time step) is the periodical, non-targeted
vaccination of animals combined with some removal through surveillance (test-
ing) strategy, hinting that eradication cannot be achieved without both strate-
gies.
Regarding the question of speed towards the eradication of the PI animals,
scenario 8 holds the best records. This is intuitively expected as scenario 8
combines the new regulation with vaccination and the shortest (semesterly) an-
tibody test scheduling per farm. Similarly, a little longer (annual) antibody test
scheduling leads to the second best eradication time. What is not so obviously
expected is the difference between scenario 13 and 5, which indicates that the
YCW strategy when combined with vaccination (strategy 13) achieves faster PI
eradication than its counterpart of the new regulation combined with vaccina-
tion (strategy 5). This is possibly a consequence of the stronger effect of the
12
Eradication time
Scenario ranking
8 14,075
9 14,335
13 14,800
5 15,235
Table 3: Record times of PI eradication for the pertinent scenarios.
YCW semesterly testing when compared to the average animal arrival times,
which in turns determines the time of the antigen test in the new regulation.
Note that the eradication time lags between the rankings translate to roughly
a year.
Finally, the threshold farm size for PI animals to exist at the end of the
simulation varies depending on the scenario we are looking at. In all the relevant
scenarios, it is intuitive to expect the PI prevalence shifted towards the large
farms of the input distribution, so that the SIR-sort of dynamics can work
better (well-mixed conditions). The sole scenario however where the threshold
is shifted to mid-size farms is the first, where the system has been left to evolve
freely. This is the case where farms with a population of above 340 animals
contribute to the persistence of the PI animals throughout the simulation runs.
Feature analysis of time-series. As far as time-series are concerned, there are
two prominent, distinct components we can discern. Firstly, the infectious
states’ evolution and secondly the population in absolute numbers. For the
former we allow the discussion to revolve around the normalized population.
Regarding the global evolution of the infectious states in figures 5, 6 (the
latter focuses only on the infectious states) we should make a number of remarks
for the interpretation of each scenario separately.
• Scenario 1 (baseline)
After a well-understood [34, 35] initial epidemic transient peak (≈ af-
ter 1,000 days) representing the outbreak from the initial infectious seeds
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Figure 3: PI bar chart of the system’s farms at the final time step for scenarios 1 to 13.
Eradication is achieved for scenarios 5 (new regulation and vaccination), 8 (vaccination and
YCW with a semesterly period), 9 (vaccination and YCW with an annual period) and 13
(new regulation, vaccination and YCW with a semesterly period). See table 3.
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within the farm level (see the initial conditions in the Materials and Meth-
ods section) and from in-between farms (through movements) the system’s
infectious state fractions tend to an equilibrium state, with a PI preva-
lence of around 1.1%. Correspondingly, the PI fraction distribution along
all farms in figure 3 is the most pronounced of all the scenarios, which is
logical as there is no counter measure. Up to the 10,000th time step the
behavior of all the scenarios is identical.
• Scenarios 2, 3
Beyond the 10,000th time step the recovered (R) fraction drops signifi-
cantly and the respective susceptible (S) increases. What happens is that
due to the old regulations’ effect the PI animals are being removed rela-
tively fast (faster in the new regulation than in the old) and therefore the
naive population, i.e. a population of S, is reinstated. When scenario 2
and 3 are compared graphically on the same scale there is no significant
difference between them. However, the new regulation’s effect in scenario
3 (partly a shorter time between two antigen tests and mostly the pro-
bation of a farm upon a PI detection) is more pronounced towards the
eradication of PI animals. Taking into account the respective PI popula-
tion fractions along the different farms in figure 3, despite the fact that for
scenario 3 we witness a higher PI fraction in some farms than in scenario 2,
still the PI fraction distribution is narrower in scenario 3 than in scenario
2 supporting our previous assessment that the new regulation should be
more effective than the old one towards the aim of the PI eradication. The
higher PI prevalence in the farm distribution of figure 3 for scenario 3 is
also a result of the input farm-size distribution’s heterogeneities. Overall,
scenario 3 depicts the current situation in Germany. The time frame be-
tween the 10,000th day and the 12,006th day corresponds roughly to the
five and a half years (the half year difference with 2016 refers to a tran-
sition period from one mandate to the next) of the old regulation’s effect
in Germany.
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• Scenario 4
Beyond the 10,000th and up to the 12,373d time step we observe as ex-
pected the same behavior as in scenario 3. After that point a behavior
similar to that of scenario 1 reappears due to the lift of the intervention
strategies. The final PI prevalence nevertheless appears to be slightly less
than that of scenario 1, a fact which is reflected in the distribution width
of the corresponding scenario of figure 3 when compared to the width of
the distribution for scenario 1. This could be mainly attributed to the
fact that at the point of the simulation where the intervention strategies
are lifted the population has settled on a fixed point (see figure 4), which
is robust to the variations we implemented in the simulation plan (not
presented due to minimal, if any, observed changes when compared to the
baseline scenario in figure 4). Thus the animals’ movements could lead to
fewer infections towards the steady state.
• Scenario 5
The behavior for this scenario is similar to scenario 3 with the essential
difference starting from the 12,373d step where vaccination is added to the
new regulation. This action promotes the R population and conversely re-
duces the S leading the curves to cross for a third time in figure 5 before
they settle on a steady state. The fact that not all of the animals become
immune at the steady state has to do with the interplay between the vac-
cination and the breeding dynamics, which sustain a non-zero susceptible
population. As revealed in figure 3 this is one of the scenarios which leads
to a PI extinction at the end of the simulation.
• Scenarios 6, 7
In scenarios 6 and 7 the effect of scenario 3 has nearly eradicated the PI
animals therefore not exhibiting any dramatic difference from the YCW’s
implementation from the 12,373th day onwards, either with a periodicity
of a semester (scenario 6 with strategy 5a) or of a year (scenario 7 with
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strategy 5b). The two scenarios’ behavior is similar to that of 3, with 6
(semesterly YCW testing) leading to a higher naive population reestab-
lishment than 7 (annual YCW testing). This last observation is easier to
see in the respective distribution of figure 3: the distribution of scenario
6 is narrower than that of scenario 7.
• Scenarios 8, 9
Similarly to scenarios 6 and 7, in scenarios 8 and 9 the effect of scenario
3 has nearly depleted the PI population by the 12,006th day to see any
relevant effect afterwards. However, the inclusion of vaccination leads to
a behavior similar to that of scenario 5 for that last segment of the simu-
lation. The two scenarios, like 5, also lead to a final state PI eradication,
albeit at faster rates than scenario 5.
• Scenario 10
In scenario 10 the YCW strategy beyond the 12,006th day induces some
periodicity in the PI population. This is an interesting effect which is
attributed to the periodicity of the YCW test. The (declining) peaks’
width of the PI population’s fraction in figure 5 signify the semesterly
periodicity of the YCW test, which would remove PI animals generated
in the time frame of no testing. This periodicity can also be seen by the
declining ripples on the S and R curves in the corresponding plot of figure
5. This last effect would be induced by the infectious transmissions of the
recurring PI animals. As suggested in figure 6, the respective distribution
of figure 3 indicates that at the final state there is still some non negligent
PI occurrence in the farms. Although in global population terms this PI
prevalence seems to be rather low (less than 0.5%) it is rather alarming
that PI animals are relatively broadly distributed along the system’s farms,
introducing a risk of recurring future infections.
• Scenario 11
Scenario 11 beyond the 12,373d day is again similar in behavior to sce-
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nario 5 concerning the S and R curves in the corresponding plot of figure
5, although less pronounced than scenario 5. Looking closely at the re-
spective plot of figure 6 nonetheless we observe a short period where the
PI population shoots upwards and is replenished to around the final state
without strategy before dropping to minimal levels in the following seg-
ment of the simulation. This has to do with the success probabilities of
the tests’ accuracy and the working probabilities of the vaccination on the
PI prevalence, namely that the indiscriminate vaccination scheduling pro-
tocol has a slower success rate than that of the ear tag testing. Especially
for the peak observed after the 12,373d day, it is a result of non-targeted
vaccination (e.g. vaccination on recovered pregnant cows that are destined
to produce a PI will not change the advent of the PI) in conjunction with
the scheduling mechanism of the vaccination itself, which is intertwined
with the insemination, as the latter needs to be scheduled at least 42 days
after the vaccination. To demonstrate the inefficiency of non-targeted
vaccination in one last manner, although the PI fraction has become very
low, it is rather extraordinary that after 10,000 days (around 27 years) of
the vaccination strategy’s effect there is still a relatively (say to that of
scenario 6) broad PI fraction distribution along the system’s farms.
• Scenario 12
Scenario 12 combines the new regulation with indiscriminate vaccination
beyond the 12,373d and up to the 12,738th day following similar results to
scenario 11. However, the post 12,738th day behavior, which removes the
new regulation’s effect, exhibits again a similar, yet lower peak in PI as
in scenario 11 before reaching minimal levels of the PI population. This
can be attributed to a prolonged declining effect of PI-removed animals
induced from the prior enforcement of the new regulation. Otherwise,
in terms of the final state of the PI fraction’s distribution along farms in
figure 3 the situation is comparable to that of scenario 11 even with slightly
broader and higher PI fractions. This demonstrates how unpredictably
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and inefficiently non-targeted vaccination can affect the PI prevalence of
the system: even with a previously combined effect of vaccination with
the new regulation, when vaccination is the sole intervention strategy it
fails to lead to the eradication of the PI population even in a time-span of
26 years.
• Scenario 13
For scenario 13 the behavior is similar to scenario 12 up to the 12,738th
day. Beyond that we observe the first peak of the periodical PI increase
(roughly extending to a semester again, which is the period of the YCW
test) as in scenario 10, but with a smaller value due to the vaccination,
which accompanies the YCW strategy at this stage. Henceforth the PI
population is led to extinction by the vaccination’s effect as can be seen in
figure 3, underlying once again the importance of testing in the enforced
strategy towards PI eradication.
In respect to the population’s evolution in absolute numbers (figure 4), we
have already commented on it through the infectious states. After the tran-
sient upon commencement due to the system’s initial conditions, the population
quickly settles on a fixed point, which is robust on the perturbations introduced
by the different intervention strategies at various points in time. A striking
feature that may be clearer after commenting is the decaying periodicity of the
ripples observed in figure 4. That is due to the initialized insemination events
for the cows and their well-defined life-cycles, thus leading to the series of peaks,
which are averaged collectively in time.
Furthermore, in figures 7 and 8 we explored the variance of the PI prevalence
in the population (in gray) around a mean value and its distribution density at
t = 13, 000 (i.e. the epidemic outbreak’s peak exhibited in scenarios 4 and
10-13). The variance for each scenario was achieved by choosing 100 different
integer seeds (ranging from 2,333,600,960 to 2,333,601,060) for the stochastic
environment of the population and allowing it to run for each one of them. We
performed those runs for all the 13 scenarios of the simulation plan 5. The
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fact that the PI population fraction mean is slightly dropping in time is not
alarming as this is a mere indication that the fixed point is being approached at
a rate so low that is insignificant for any practical purpose (i.e. policy making).
The reason for this slow rate of decline in the PI population may be due to
an underestimation of the transmission rates of BVD, which were taken from
the literature [24]. Note that the times shown in figure 7 are only beyond the
9,000th time step. That is because the strategies vary only after the 10,000th
time step. Extensive sensitivity analysis on the vaccination and testing can also
be found in [15].
Finally, in figure 9 we see the results of the Mann-Whitman U test for all
the 13 scenarios in 13 blocks and grouped in different colors with a temporal
increment (columns) of 1,000 time steps. Any changes start from the 10,000th
time step where strategies change according to table 2. When the test accepts
the null hypothesis for a number of scenarios, they are grouped with the same
color within the column. Then for each increment the figure delineates the dif-
ferentiation of the underlying population (i.e. the distribution of the infectious
states) to the next for each block-scenario.
4. Discussion
Our results are among a series [9, 10, 13, 24] demonstrating the predic-
tive power and insight that computational models can provide in the efforts
of governance regarding epidemic spread containment in domesticated animal
populations. For the case of BVD, we defined general scenarios with disease
spread dynamics limited within the borders of a given country. These scenarios
can be affected by control measures as well as the import of PI animals, which
cannot be wholly prevented in practice when the laws of supply and demand are
in effect and the country in question has no say over the biosurveillance regula-
tions or their enforcement for the countries exporting to it. Significantly, all the
results pinpoint to the importance of combined herd immunization (vaccination)
and surveillance actions for achieving PI eradication, given a high sensitivity of
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Figure 4: Global population evolution for the baseline scenario 1. The rest of the scenarios
exhibit a statistically similar behaviour and are therefor not shown.
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Figure 5: Susceptible (solid, blue line), transiently infected (dashed red line), recovered
(dotted-dashed, green line) and PI (dashed-dotted, magenta line) fractions of the popula-
tion for scenarios 1 to 13. Merely a magnification of figure 4 around the infectious states.
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Figure 6: Transiently infected (dashed red line) and PI (dashed-dotted, magenta line) fractions
of the population for scenarios 1 to 13.
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Figure 7: Variance around the mean PI prevalence (%) for the 13 different scenarios at
t = 13, 000.
Figure 8: Variance distributions of the PI prevalence at t=13000 for the 13 different scenarios.
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Figure 9: Similarity of the 13 scenarios of table 2 according to the Mann-Whitman U test.
BVD tests. As expected, when combined with vaccination, different surveillance
practices lead to a range of record times up to eradication, with an antibody
test augmentation of the current regulation topping all the alternatives. Fur-
thermore, if vaccination is to be combined with biosurveillance programs then a
refinement of the non-targeted practice can be certainly implemented with no-
ticeable economical effects. In any case, the PI eradication times have to always
be weighted against the foreseeable involved costs in the deployment of each
scenario at the country scale. For the case-study of Germany such an analysis
can be found in [16]. Finally, for an optimal policy implementation the cost
reduction induced by antibody test practices (YCW strategy), namely the bulk
milk tank or serum test pool versus the individual blood tests should be taken
into account.
Regarding the establishment of BVD in a farm population our results hinted
on a critical population size of the farms leading to a persistent epidemic with-
out intervention. In the cases where intervention still led to an endemic final
state the farm sizes contributing to the epidemics were shifted to the largest
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farms of the systems. This is a consequence of the SIR dynamics taking place
at the farm level: a well-mixed, large population with endemic conditions (infec-
tious versus recovery rate ratio) including demographic changes can exhibit an
endemic equilibrium point [35]. Nevertheless, the simulation being stochastic,
one can expect fluctuations of the farm size threshold for endemicity.
In terms of extensions of the current work, the influence of the scaling on
the predictions of the system should be investigated. Computationally the in-
clusion of more farms requires exponentially more resources in memory even for
small farms, while increasing the number of animals in very few farms depletes
memory resources much slower. Scaling the system to less farms and popula-
tion would give a better understanding of the finite-size effects (lower bound)
on the epidemic dynamics. Another parameter that can be further inquired is
the sensitivity of the infection spread among farms to the farm size distribution
given initially, i.e. to the heterogeneity of the distribution. Moreover, assuming
the cattle movement rules are reasonably similar in most E.U. countries due to
unified mandates and similar practices, the code employed in this work could be
applied to extract results for at least any country within the union. Additionally,
the inclusion of subtleties such as weighted or biased trading or dynamics at the
node level would delve to an ever greater level of detail, attempting to capture
features such as the preferential trade (attachment) or the observed declining
trend of farms in Germany in the last decade (according to the federal statisti-
cal bureau of Germany) respectively. Last but not least and from a theoretical
point of view, the computation of a threshold quantity from parameters of the
simulation for the epidemic outbreak could be computed in a metapopulation
manner as in [36]. From there onwards various vaccination strategies for herd
immunization can be encompassed to alter the epidemic thresholds as in [37].
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Supplementary Material
Single Farm Dynamics and PI Effect from Source Farm
Single Farm Dynamics
We develop some intuition on a minimal example of how the system should
behave in terms of infectious states and population in figures 10a, 10b and 10c
respectively. The simulation runs for the same settings as in the main text
without any intervention strategy, as calibrated for the case of Germany in
[15] and with no PI animals originating from the source farm. The population
of the single farm is set to 1,000 animals to achieve well-mixed conditions for
the epidemic dynamics and to diminish finite-size effects. Since there is an
inherent supply and demand mechanism to equalize the imbalance caused by
demographic factors in the system, the minimum working setup requires the
source and the drain farms as well. We notice therefore that the population
fluctuates around the initial value of 1,000.
Moreover, the peak of infection is much more pronounced when only a single
farm is considered as can be seen in figure 10b. This effect is typical of SIR
dynamics and depends on the involved infectious and recovery rates [35]. The
spatial structure may then shift the outbreak peak in value and time depending
on the exact heterogeneities (farm size distribution) and connectivity (supply
and demand) of the farm-nodes involved in the simulation.
Effect of PIs from the Source Farm
For the single farm with 2% probability of introduction of PI animals through
the source farm, the demographic time-series is virtually identical to the one for
no PI animals entering the system through the source farm. The settings remain
always as those in the main text without any intervention strategy.
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(a) All states’ evolution. (b) Infectious states’ evolution.
(c) Demographic evolution.
Figure 10: All the S, I, R and P states in a single graph 10a for the single farm with no PI
inputs and only the infectious I and P in 10b. Moreover, we see in 10c the evolution of the
same farm’s population for no intervention strategy with animal inputs and outputs (source
and drain farm) to satisfy its demand that its population be constant.
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(a) All states’ evolution. (b) Infectious states’ evolution.
Figure 11: The respective evolution plots of figure 10 but for a probability of a PI introduction
from the source farm of 2%.
What stands out in figures 11a and 11b in respect to their counterparts
10a and 10b (the demographics are statistically identical in both cases and
are therefore skipped in figure 11) of no PI animals’ introduction from the
source farm is the epidemic outbreak peak value and the effect this has on the
immune, R class of animals. The PI peak is over twice times higher than in
the former case and therefore the R class of animals remains consistently at
high levels, without much fluctuation. This is a consequence of the increased
secondary, transient transmissions induced to susceptible animals from the case
of introduced PI animals in the system. These behaviors are both intuitively
expected as the number of secondary, transient infections should be mainly
proportional to the number of PI animals in the system, them being the main
contributor of the epidemic spread for both the well-mixed (local) and spatially
distributed (network) dynamics.
Sensitivity Analysis
In the following we make a sensitivity analysis on four factors dominating
over the epidemic, testing and vaccination dynamics, as well as on the stochastic
fluctuations of the simulations overall.
1. Transmission Rates
32
PIfinal No βTI βPI
11 0.01 0.1
210 0.01 0.5
278 0.01 0.8
12 0.03 0.1
305 0.03 0.5
12 0.05 0.1
317 0.05 0.8
21 0.1 0.1
Table 4: Final number of persistently infected animals as a function of βTI and βPI.
The catalytic factor affecting the final state of the PI animals is shown to
be the PI transmission coefficient βPI as demonstrated in table 4. This
result is somewhat contrary to that of [25] mainly because the between-
herd (animal group in the authors’ case) dynamics were not considered in
our simulation as opposed to that work. To be precise, despite the form
of the infectious dynamics being nearly identical (see [15]), the authors of
[25] considered only a five animal herd group, therefore introducing pro-
nounced finite-size effects in their results. Furthermore, in the simulation
of our work, due to the effect of vertical transmissions, i.e. PI animals la-
tently appearing in the system after a pregnant cow’s infection, the effect
of the PI transmission coefficient βPI dominates over βTI. In addition, the
sensitivity analysis of [25] on the PI animals’ death rates is not directly
comparable to our work, as we presume a uniform random distribution for
that purpose.
2. Ear Tag and Retesting Laps
For the tests’ effect on the PI prevalence their sensitivity was examined by
varying the test’s accuracy probability as seen in figure 12. Not surpris-
ingly, as the sensitivity probability tends to unity the PI prevalence tends
to eradication as all the infected animals are identified and subsequently
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Figure 12: Scenario 3 (reference the simulation plan from the main text) for different test
accuracy probabilities ranging from 0 to 1, as outlined in table 5. The effect of the ear tag
test protocol is enforced from day 10,000 onwards.
sent to the drain farm (slaughterhouse).
3. Vaccination Success Probability
For the vaccination’s effect on the PI prevalence the vaccination’s working
probability was varied from zero to one as demonstrated in figure 13. As
with the tests’ sensitivity success probability, the increase of certainty
for the vaccine’s working probability leads to eventual extinction of the
PI population. However, the vaccination’s effect on the PI population is
slower than that of the tests’ sensitivity success and requires near certainty
values to lead to extinction. This could be attributed to the fact that
indiscriminate vaccination of animals regardless of their infectious status
reaches its intended targets slower than tests of all animals, which aim to
identify and remove the infected ones.
4. Variance
For completeness and reliability of the stochastic nature of the simulation
a sensitivity analysis was performed on the PI prevalence percentage as
a function of the seeds of the random number generator as displayed in
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Probability Style (Position)
0 Solid, blue (left)
0.1 Dashed, red (left)
0.2 Dotted-dashed, green (left)
0.3 Dashed, dotted, magenta (left)
0.8 Solid, blue (right)
0.98 Dashed, red (right)
0.99 Dotted-dashed, green (right)
0.998 Dashed, dotted, magenta (right)
1 Dotted, black (right)
Table 5: Probabilities of the test’s sensitivity for scenario 3 (reference the simulation plan
from the main text).
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Figure 13: Strategy 8 (reference the simulation plan from the main text) for different vacci-
nation working probabilities ranging from 0 to 1 as outlined in table 6.
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Probability Style (Position)
0 Solid, blue (left)
0.1 Dashed, red (left)
0.2 Dotted-dashed, green (left)
0.3 Dashed, dotted, magenta (left)
0.8 Solid, blue (right)
0.9 Red, dashed (right)
0.985 (default) Dotted-dashed, green (right)
1 Dashed-dotted, magenta (right)
Table 6: Vaccination working probabilities for the sensitivity of strategy 8 (reference the
simulation plan from the main text).
figure 14. The differences proved to be of the order of 0.001% implying
that the results are robust to stochastic fluctuations.
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Figure 14: Scenario 1 (reference the simulation plan from the main text) for different seeds
as outlined in table 7.
Seed No Style (Position)
2,333,600,960 Solid, blue (left)
2,333,600,970 Dashed, red (left)
2,333,601,960 Dotted-dashed, green (left)
2,333,620,963 Dashed, dotted, magenta (left)
2,333,710,962 Dotted, black (left)
2,333,970,967 Solid, blue (right)
2,333,650,932 Dashed, red (right)
4,333,600,860 Dotted-dashed, green (right)
3,323,601,969 Dashed, dotted, magenta (right)
3,323,601,970 Dotted, black (right)
Table 7: Seeds for the variance of scenario 1 (baseline).
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